![]() On 25 May, just over two weeks after the surrender of Germany, the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued the general invasion order, leaving details to Army and Navy theater commanders. Into early 1945, inter-service disagreements over the varying approaches slowed integration of the Navy and Army concepts into a unified planning effort. In contrast, the Army developed plans for an actual invasion. Navy drew on some aspects of the pre-war War Plan Orange, which envisioned a steady Pacific advance leading to blockade and bombardment of the Home Islands. In preparation for the invasion of Japan, the U.S. This view was reinforced by the extremely fierce fighting and correspondingly heavy losses experienced during the Battle of Okinawa and concurrent mass kamikaze attacks on Allied shipping. Thus, the worst-case scenario-that of an unyielding foe who would fight to the death-had to be assumed and the invasion of the Home Islands planned. Clarity about the debate within the Japanese leadership continued to elude the West despite excellent intelligence derived from intercepts of encoded Japanese diplomatic and military message traffic (Magic and Ultra). Allied Invasion PlanningĪllied war aims in regard to Japan, which were reiterated at numerious strategic planning conferences, had one goal: the enemy’s unconditional surrender. Ketsu-Go focused on these, with special emphasis on the Tokyo–Kanto Plain area and on the southern island of Kyushu, where the initial landings were expected. Due to Japan’s geography, it was relatively easy to predict Allied landing areas. This view led to the formulation of a master defense plan ( Ketsu-Go-“Decisive” Operation), which was completed in early April. If Allied forces did, in fact, invade the Home Islands and the initial assault could be repulsed or made too costly for Western governments to bear, Japan would still be able to retain its honor. Paradoxically, the Japanese Imperial Headquarters formulated a guardedly positive assessment of the immediate strategic picture: Allied-specifically American-war fatigue would preclude protracted blockade and aerial bombardment and had the potential to lead to a negotiated settlement. Overall, however, the humiliation of de facto surrender and the possible abdication of the emperor and the abolition of imperial reign still appeared impossible to accept. However, the country’s leadership remained divided over immediate courses of action at this juncture, with the emperor and a minority of his closest advisers from the Supreme Council for the Direction of War (the “Big Six”) tending to favor a peace agreement negotiated via the still-neutral USSR or other nonbelligerant nation and, on the other extreme, much of the Imperial Army’s leadership vowing to fight to the end. Secret assessments that Japan would not survive another year of war circulated in the highest Japanese government circles and it was clearly realized that the Home Islands would likely be invaded before the end of 1945. These circumstances strongly pointed toward defeat and destruction. Although the Japanese did their utmost to forestall immediate conflict with USSR, the country’s possessions on the Asian mainland (Manchuria and Korea) and the maritime territories to the north of the Home Islands were now vulnerable to a daunting potential foe. Moreover, the Soviet Union had refused to renew its neutrality pact with Japan. ![]() Strict conservation of available aviation fuel grounded most of Japan’s still considerable numbers of combat aircraft. The Imperial Navy no longer had enough fuel reserves to go to sea and many ships had been relegated to the role of portside antiaircraft platforms. ![]() Navy’s highly effective submarine blockade, as well as the joint Navy–Army Air Forces aerial mining campaign, had brought about rapidly increasing shortages of food, fuel, and strategic materials that left both the Japanese military and civilian populace in dire straits. Devastating air raids (alone the first firebombing raid on Tokyo during the night of 9/10 March 1945 claimed an estimated 100,000 lives) had razed the interconnected industrial/residential districts of most urban areas. invasions of Iwo Jima in February and Okinawa in April had brought the Pacific War to the Japanese Home Islands’ doorsteps. The spring of 1945 found the Japanese Empire in a desperate situation. ![]()
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